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Abuse of Process-A Misunderstood Concept
Charles G. Bretz, Jr.*

T

OrIo have said that there is no difference between
an action for abuse of process and one for malicious prosecution.'
Other jurisdictions likewise have had trouble distinguishing the two
torts. 2 Apparently, this is because the term has been used to describe
a variety of dissimilar situations which are alike only in that there has3
been actionable injury as a result of the improper use of a legal process.
To a lesser extent, the confusion may also have resulted from the varying terms used to describe the two actions, 4 coupled with the imprecise
use of the terms by some courts. 5
HE COURTS OF

Distinction from Malicious Prosecution
In spite of the difficulty courts have had in distinguishing the two
actions, the authorities everywhere are in agreement that the tort abuse
of process is clearly distinguishable from malicious prosecution.6 Malicious prosecution is wrongfully commencing an action or causing process
to issue, whereas the gist of an action for abuse of process is using
a legal process for an improper purpose after the process has been issued.7 Process in the strict sense refers to writs, warrants, mandates, or
* B.A., M.B.A., University of Cincinnati; Third-year student at Cleveland State University College of Law.
I Detwilder Co. v. Holly, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 121 (Ct. of App. 1925); Delk v. Colonial
Finance Co., 118 Ohio App. 451, 194 N.E.2d 885 (1963), dismissed for want of debatable question, 175 Ohio St. 248, 193 N.E.2d 153 (1963).
2 Italian Star Line v. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 53 F.2d 359, 361
(2d Cir. 1931), 80 A.L.R. 576, 579.
3 Id.
4 In denomination of abuse of process, some courts have used the term malicious
abuse of process; other courts have used the term malicious use of process to describe an action for the wrongful initiation of a civil suit.
5 Chamberlin Co. of America v. Mays, 96 Ga. App. 755, 101 S.E.2d 728 (1957) (both
lack of probable cause and malice are essential elements of an action for malicious
abuse of process); Tapley v. Youmans, 95 Ga. App. 161, 97 S.E.2d 365 (1957) (a prior
termination in favor of the plaintiff is not required in order to maintain an action for
malicious abuse of legal process).
6 Dean v. Kochendorfer, 237 N.Y.384, 143 N.E. 229 (1924); Brantley v. RhodesHaverty Furniture Co., 131 Ga. 276, 62 S.E. 222 (1908); Ash v. Cohn, 119 N.J.L. 54, 194
A. 174 (Ct. of Err. and App. 1937); Glidewell v. Murray-Lacy and Co., 124 Va. 563,
98 S.E. 665 (1919); Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 876 (West Publ. Co., St.
Paul, 1964 3d ed.); 1 Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts 438 (Callaghan and Co.,
Chicago, 1932 4th ed.); 2 Encyc. of Negligence §§ 415, 416 (1962); see 3 Restatement
of Torts, §§ 653-682 (1938); An examination of West's American Digest System from
the current edition back through the Century edition under abuse of process, reveals
that no other court is reported to have said that there is no difference between abuse
of process and malicious prosecution.
7 Hauser v. Bartow, 273 N.Y. 370, 7 N.E.2d 268 (1937); Ash v. Cohn, supra, n. 6;
Prosser, supra, n. 6.
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other processes issued by a court.S Actions for abuse of process are most
commonly found in situations where writs of attachment or execution
or warrants of arrest are misused. 9
The elements of an action for malicious prosecution are (1) commencing an action (a) without probable cause and (b) with malice and
(2) a termination of the original action in favor of the defendant. 0
In contrast, the elements for abuse of process are (1) an ulterior motive
and (2) an act not proper or within the scope of the process."
The regular use of process, even though the motives are improper,
is not an abuse of process. 12 To illustrate, the mere fact that a creditor
procures a warrant for the arrest of his debtor, who has violated a law,
for the purpose of collecting the debt does not constitute an abuse of
process so long as the creditor's acts with regard to the criminal process
are proper and within the scope of that process. This is so even though
there is either a payment of the debt as a result of the criminal prosecution or there is a voluntary settlement of the debt and criminal prosecution is withdrawn. To do a lawful act in a lawful manner is not actionable. 3 However, the creditor goes beyond the regular scope of the
criminal process if he uses that process to compel a settlement from the
14

debtor.

Since the essence of abuse of process is the improper use of process
which has been issued, there is no requirement that the original action
be terminated, or if it has been terminated that the termination be in
favor of the plaintiff.15 The cause of action accrues at the time of the improper use.1 Likewise, the validity or invalidity of the issuance of the
process is immaterial, and abuse of process will lie even though the
17
process was wrongfully initiated.
The leading case on abuse of process is the English case of Grainger
v. Hill.'" In that case, a mortgagee of a ship, knowing that the master
was unable to repay the loan, had the master arrested on the debt in
8 Black's Law Dictionary 1370 (4th ed. 1968).

9 The Nature and Limitations of the Remedy Available to the Victim of a Misuse of
the Legal Process: The Tort of Abuse of Process, 2 Val. U. L. Rev. 129 (1967).
10 Rogers v. Barbera, 170 Ohio St. 241, 164 N.E.2d 162 (1960); Woodruff v. Paschen,
105 Ohio St. 396, 137 N.E. 867 (1922).
11 Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947); Restatement of Torts,
§ 682 (1938).
12 Brown v. Robertson, 120 Ind. App. 434, 92 N.E.2d 856 (1950).
13 Glidewell v. Murray-Lacy and Co., supra n. 6.
14 Mullins v. Sanders, 189 Va. 624, 54 S.E.2d 116 (1949).
15 Baldwin v. Davis, 188 Ga. 587, 4 S.E.2d 458 (1939); Malone v. Belcher, 216 Mass.

209, 103 N.E. 637 (1913); Ash v. Cohn, sup'ra, n. 6.
16 Little v. Sowers, 167 Kan. 72, 204 P.2d 605 (1949).
17

Hoppe v. Klapperich, supra n. 11.

'8

4 Bing. (N.C.) 211 (Eng. 1836).
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order to compel him to give up the ship's registry. This decision was
widely followed, 19 and the tort is now generally recognized throughout
the United States.
In the early cases, the action was limited to those situations in
which one was forced to do some collateral thing that he could not otherwise be compelled to do, in other words a form of extortion. 20 The
modern action, however, has been broadened to include any act not
within the scope of the process, whether such result could be obtained
lawfully or otherwise. 2
Cases in which abuse of process has been found can generally be
arranged into three groups;

22

(1)

seizure of the property of plaintiff, 23

(2) seizure of the plaintiff himself in a civil action, 24 and (3) improper
25
use of criminal process.
The Ohio Rule-Purposely Out of Line or a Misinterpretation of Early
Cases?
The first reference in Ohio to the term abuse of process appears in
the case of Pope v. Pollock.26 Plaintiff had entered into a leasehold after
negotiations with the defendant as agent for the owner. Subsequently,
on two different occasions and before two different justices of the peace,
defendant-agent brought an action for forcible entry and detainer against
the plaintiff. In an action for malicious prosecution, the trial court found
that the actions in forcible entry and detainer were brought maliciously
and without probable cause. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in affirming
judgment for plaintiff, said, "(w)here an action is brought and prosecuted maliciously, and without probable cause, it is an abuse of legal
process." 27 (emphasis added).
Pope v. Pollock was decided 53 years after Graingerv. Hill. During
those years, American courts were following the Grainger decision, so
19 Gillam, Abuse of Process, 16 N.C. L. Rev. 276, 280 (1938).
20 Lockhart v. Bear, 117 N.C. 298, 23 S.E. 484 (1895) (civil arrest used to coerce levy
on exempted property); McClenny v. Inverarity, 80 Kan. 569, 103 P. 82 (1909)
(threat of criminal action to extort money).
21 Comment, 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 123 (1938).
22 Gillam, supra, n. 19.
23 Saliem v. Glovsky, 132 Me. 402, 172 A. 4 (1934) (excessive attachment in satisfaction of a judgment); Templeton Feed & Grain Co., v. Ralston Purina Co., 72 Cal.
Rptr. 344, 446 P. 2d 152 (1968) (seizure of turkeys on Nov. 9 in order to compel the
owner of the flock to pay the debt of another).
24 Brantley v. Rhodes-Haverty Furniture Co., 131 Ga. 276, 62 S.E. 222 (1908) (plaintiff had been arrested and jailed in a bail trover action; Mrs. Brantley, after exclaiming that she would give up anything, except her honor, to be released from jail,
surrendered a diamond broach and entered into a new contract with her creditor).
25 McGann v. Allen, 105 Conn. Rpts. 177, 134 A. 810 (1926) (police officer took prisoner to a place other than that commanded by the arrest warrant).
26 46 Ohio St. 367, 21 N.E. 356 (1889).
27 Id. at 369.
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the term abuse of process had acquired a particular meaning in the
United States in spite of the confusion in distinguishing the action from
malicious prosecution. In the Pope case, however, it appears as though
the court was using the term to characterize the offensiveness of that
particular action, viz., a malicious prosecution of successive forcible entry and detainer actions, rather than to identify the tort, abuse of process.
Throughout the opinion, the court describes plaintiff's action as one for
malicious prosecution, whereas there is only one place where the term
abuse of process is used.
An action for forcible entry and detainer is a summary action for
removal from land; 28 it would seem that this is precisely what plaintiff
in the original actions intended to accomplish. The original actions were
commenced maliciously and without probable cause, so an improper
motive can be inferred. However, there is no evidence of any improper
act in the prosecution of the forcible entry and detainer actions; on these
facts, there could be no abuse of process.
After this apparently imprecise use of the term abuse of process, the
next reference to the term in a tort action in Ohio is a passing one in
paragraph 1 of the syllabus by the court in Crow v. Sims:
A suit for damages for causing an attachment to issue as auxiliary
to a civil action for debt is no exception to the general rule that in
all actions at common law for malicious prosecution or for the abuse
of the processes of the court, malice and want of probable cause
must be alleged and proven. 29 (emphasis added).
This case contains neither a citation to any authority concerning malicious prosecution or abuse of process nor a discussion about either action.
In this regard, the case is of limited value, although it figures in a later
decision.
The next reference to the term in a tort action is the opinion in the
case of Detwilder Co. v. Holly.30 In this case, defendant, on a claim of
$350, levied on furniture and fixtures worth $6,000. After a decision for
plaintiff in the trial court, the Lucas County Court of Appeals reversed
on the grounds that the action was not brought within the one year statute of limitations prescribed for malicious prosecution. 31 On application
for rehearing, counsel for plaintiff argued that the court of appeals had
failed to distinguish between an action for malicious prosecution and one
for abuse of process. The application for rehearing was denied. The
abstractor then notes that, "(t)he court held that, in this state, an abuse
of process is malicious prosecution and that malicious prosecution is an
abuse of process." 32 The court cited, inter alia, Pope v. Pollock.
Black's Law Dictionary 774 (4th ed. 1968).
88 Ohio St. 214, 102 N.E. 741 (1913).
30 3 Ohio L. Abs. 121 (Ct. of App. 1925).
31 Rev. Stat. of Ohio § 4983 (as amended 1894).
32 3 Ohio L. Abs. 121, 122 (Ct. of App. 1925).
28
29
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It is conjecture to be sure, however, it seems possible that all the
court meant in saying that there was no difference between the two
actions was that abuse of process was to be included within the one year
statute of limitations prescribed for malicious prosecution.
Whatever, this is probably the most unfortunate decision of all, for
not only does it begin a series of cases (all discussed below) which accept without question the notion that there is no distinction between
abuse of process and malicious prosecution, but here is a fact situation
which appears to be an abuse of process in the sense in which other
33
jurisdictions have used the term, viz., excessive attachment.
The next reference to the term abuse of process in a tort action is
in Calvin v. Martin.3 4 Defendant-landlord had obtained a certificate of
eviction from the United States Housing Expediter in accordance with
provisions of the Federal Housing and Rent Act in order to remodel and
repair the premises. The landlord filed an action for forcible entry and
detainer. Prior to the trial, however, the parties worked out a settlement whereby plaintiff-tenant could remain on the premises for another
two months, then he would voluntarily leave. Several months after
vacating the premises, the tenant brought an action alleging false and
fraudulent representations in obtaining the certificate of eviction and
that the landlord had failed to remodel and repair the premises in accordance with the representations in the certificate.
The Federal Housing and Rent Act did not provide a remedy for
a tenant wrongfully evicted. Although a few states, notably New York
and Massachusetts, did enact statutes providing a remedy, Ohio had not.
In those states which had not provided a statutory remedy, the injured
tenant was forced to rely on common law remedies, usually fraud and
deceit,35 although abuse of process was also used on the theory that the
36
landlord exceeded the scope of the certificate of eviction.
The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and entered a
final judgment for the defendant-landlord on the grounds that plaintiff
had failed to establish the elements of fraud and deceit and that the
action could not be considered as one for malicious prosecution or abuse
of process since plaintiff did not prevail in the original action (presumably the action filed, but not prosecuted, for forcible entry and detainer). Detwilder is cited as authority that abuse of process is "merely
another name for malicious prosecution." 31
33

Supra n. 23.

64 Ohio L. Abs. 265, 111 N.E.2d 786 (Ct. of App. 1952).
Hathaway v. Bornmann, 137 Conn. 322, 77 A.2d 91 (1950).
36 Varga v. Pareles, 137 Conn. 663, 81 A.2d 112 (1951); Tranchina v. Arcinas, 78 Cal.
App.2d 522, 178 P.2d 65 (1947).
3T 64 Ohio L. Abs. 265, 269, 111 N.E.2d 786, 789 (Ct. of App. 1952).
34
35
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Treshansky v. Northern Ohio Lumber and Timber Co.38 and Lewis
v. Public Finance Corp. of Youngstown3 9 both consider the amount of
evidence sufficient to support a finding of malicious prosecution and

abuse of process. In the Treshansky case, plaintiff brought his action for
(1) malicious prosecution, (2) slander of title, and (3) abuse of process
against a defendant who had taken judgment on a cognovit note. The
note had been acquired from a third party who was alleged to have
stolen it from the plaintiff. The court held that in the absence of evidence showing a conspiracy between the defendant and the alleged thief,
none of the actions could be maintained. In the Lewis case, the Ohio
Court of Appeals, without discussing either the fact situation or the nature of the evidence, affirmed a judgment for plaintiff in an action for
malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Neither of the cases discusses the two actions, and to that extent, they are not particularly revealing.
The last of this line of cases is Delk v. Colonial Finance.40 This was
an action for malicious prosecution of a civil action. The court found
that there was a failure of proof in that there was no malice, no seizure
of the property or arrest of the person, and that there was probable
cause for commencing the original action. However, the court needlessly
confuses the opinion by their dictum, "Ohio makes no distinction between malicious prosecution and abuse of process, considering them the
same." 41 No authority is cited.
Latest Decision Contrary to the Previous Cases
To this point, the discussion has developed the thesis that Ohio
courts have misinterpreted the cases in saying that there is no difference
between malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The most recent
case which discusses the two actions, Avco Delta Corp. v. Walker,42 is
directly contrary to the previous Ohio cases and may well indicate a
trend toward recognition of the tort, abuse of process.
In Avco Delta, plaintiff took a cognovit judgment, and, after giving
the statutory demand for payment, 43 proceeded to attach defendant's
wages. Defendant, by way of answer, alleged that the note was obtained
by fraud and filed a counterclaim for damages to credit and reputation

allegedly resulting from plaintiff's actions in obtaining judgment on the
note and effecting its collection. A demurrer to the counterclaim was
sustained on the basis that the action was one for malicious prosecution

40

7 Ohio L. Abs. 646, 30 Ohio L. Rpts. 373 (Ct. of App. 1929).
9 Ohio App.2d 215, 223 N.E.2d 828 (1967).
118 Ohio App. 451, 194 N.E.2d 885 (1963).

41

Id. at 454.

42

22 Ohio App.2d 61, 258 N.E.2d 254 (1969).
Ohio Rev. Code, § 2715.02 (as amended 1967).

38
39

43
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and, as such, required a prior termination of the original action. There
was no prior termination here since the judgment was vacated when defendant filed his answer and counterclaim.
Counsel for defendant argued that the counterclaim was not an action for malicious prosecution, but, rather, one for abuse of process. In
support, he first cited Prosser to the effect that in abuse of process it is
not necessary that the original action be terminated, as distinguished
from malicious prosecution, and then he cited Delk v. Colonial Finance
as authority for the rule that in Ohio there is no difference between the
two actions. The implication seems to be that if there is no difference
between the two actions in Ohio and if abuse of process does not require
a prior termination of the original proceedings, then no prior termination
is required here, whether the action be characterized as malicious prosecution or abuse of process.
The court examined Delk v. Colonial Finance, and observed that
the rule was apparently based on an interpretation of the syllabus in
Crow v. Sims. As previously noted, the court in Delk v. Colonial Finance cited no authority for their statement that there is no difference
between the two actions, although the court did cite Crow v. Sims two
pages later, but in a different context. Since Crow v. Sims did not discuss the difference between malicious prosecution and abuse of process,
the court in Avco Delta rejected the case as authority for the rule that
there is no difference between the two actions. As a consequence, the
court overlooked, or ignored, the other authority for the rule and turned
instead to a variety of sources (e.g., Prosser and C.J.S.) to substantiate
their conclusion that there is in fact a difference between the two actions.
Extensive quotes from 1 Am. Jur. 2d are included in the opinion to the
effect that where the complaint goes to the issuance of process, the action
is for malicious prosecution, whereas abuse of process concerns the willful perversion of process which has been issued. Since defendant's counterclaim alleged that the note was obtained by fraud, the court concluded
that the complaint went to the issuance of process and thus was an action
for malicious prosecution. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer to the counterclaim on
the grounds that an action for malicious prosecution requires a prior termination of the original action.
Avco Delta Should be Followed
Whether by design, or inadequate research, an Ohio court has said
that the tort, abuse of process is distinct from malicious prosecution. The
opinion is salutary and should be followed. Ohio plaintiffs should not be
denied a remedy for injury as a result of the improper use of a legal
process.
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Although actions for abuse of process and malicious prosecution are
generally not favored by the courts, 4 4 Ohio courts have consistently refused to permit a plaintiff to benefit from process which he has improperly used.4 5 To move from that proposition to a rule allowing relief to
a defendant who has been injured as a result of such improper use is not
a difficult step. Ohio courts ought to take that step.
44 Skarbinski v. Henry H. Krause Co., 378 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1967).
45 Buchanan v. Wilson, 254 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1958). Motion to quash service of
process on an out-of-state defendant granted; inducement by artifice to come within
the jurisdiction of the court is an abuse of process and the court will not enforce
jurisdiction so obtained.
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